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It's a (Two-)Culture Thing: The Lateral 




rom an acute and, some will argue, a harsh, 
a harsh, fantastic or even tactically naive 
naive perspective, this article examines 
examines animal liberation, vegetarianism 
vegetarianism and veganism in relation to a 
bloodless culture ideal. It suggests that the 
movement's repeated anomalies, denial of heritage, 
privileging of vegetarianism, and other concessions 
to bloody culture, restrict rather than liberate the 
full subversionary and revelatory potential of 
liberationist discourse, and with representation and 
strategy implications. 
 
‘Only the profoundest cultural needs … initially caused adult man [sic] to 
continue to drink cow milk through life’.1 
 
In The Social Construction of Nature, Klaus Eder develops a useful concept 
of two cultures - the bloody and the bloodless. He understands the 
ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as resulting 
from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the 
‘bloodless’ tradition from within Judaism and the ‘bloody’ tradition of 
ancient Greece.  
 
In Genesis, killing entered the world after the fall from grace and 
initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system of food taboos 
regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in 
Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This 
‘civilizing’ process replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of 
                                                 
1 Calvin. W. Schwabe, ‘Animals in the Ancient World’ in Aubrey Manning  and James 
Serpell, (eds), Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (Routledge, London, 
1994), p.54. 
F 
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human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and 
these by money paid to the sacrificial priests.2  
 
Modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish 
tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different 
traditional evolutionary line which emerges from the Greek polis. This 
ritual ‘civilized’ the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the 
Jewish tradition. It did not abolish them but retained them instead as a 
sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other 
groups who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into 
question.3 The dominant modern cultural code continues this older 
tradition, the bloody culture of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the 
fundamental distance from the state of nature.4 It is the co-existence of 
these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens 
two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern society. 5 
 
We shall borrow the two culture concept and use it as a structuring 
device for our own purposes and, although we shall not be clinging to 
Eder's thesis, we shall draw upon it.6 Here we shall be assuming that 
animal liberation both constitutes and aims at the transformation of 
bloody into bloodless culture, at least in the most propitious conditions 
of the Western world initially. As representative of animal liberation we 
shall take first the most often quoted works of three of the movement's 
foremost philosophers - Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan - 
but we shall not offer critiques of their use of the philosophical traditions 
out of which they come, or indeed of the traditions themselves.7 Instead, 
and in a rather severe textual reading, we shall question animal 
liberation in relation to the two cultures. To start, we shall measure the 
canonical works against the slavery analogy, drawn by animal 
                                                 
2 Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological Enlightenment 
(Sage, London, 1996), p.125. 
3 Ibid., p.126. 
4 Ibid., pp.129-130. 
5 Ibid., p.132. 
6 Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and bloodless-vegetarian 
cultures throughout, for Eder depicts ecological reason as vegetarian culture when the 
ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) whilst animal 
liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). Eder also tends to run animals and 
nature together, and views animal liberation almost wholly in utilitarianist terms. 
Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous culture as a development of bloody 
culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we shall use carnivorous and 
bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless.  
7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals , 1975 
(Avon, New York, 1977); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals , 1977 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983 
(Routledge, London, 1988).  
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advocates for centuries, which will allow us to explore statements of 
animal liberation intent and therefore gain clues as to its ‘culture’ status, 
which will then be examined against a different model. We shall finally 
be able to suggest certain implications of the findings. 
 
The Slavery Analogy 
 
In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken 
public consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the 
animal liberation movement uses several parallels, and abolitionism 
seems to be the most pertinent. Black peoples and other Others under 
slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable 
(and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a 
respectable economic system. The systematic atrocities of human 
slavery bear striking resemblance to the concept and practices of 
institutionalized animal use and continuities are identifiable.8 Moreover, 
both animal use and human slavery have been considered at various 
times synonymous with the process of civilizing and the progress of 
civilization. 
 
Let us assume the case then, acknowledging that there will always be 
exceptional, extraordinary and non-representative situations to which 
no philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to 
assume, as the philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute 
inviolability of all animal life). Let us assume that an animal liberation 
case could be made out, declaring that, à la the abolitionist case, humans 
should not deliberately use nonhumans for any non-symbolic purpose 
(except perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in 
any material way in order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of 
the abolitionists was abolition, not kinder treatment, better conditions, 
longer chains, fewer slaves, gentle usage or a different kind of slavery. 
Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world (or 
most of it) came to agree or to see the wrong and put an end to it. How 
do the philosophers’ prescriptions stand in relation to this abolitionism? 
Not full square. 
 
Clark's promotion of anti-vivisection, for instance, is qualified by talk of 
abolishing ‘most’ biomedical research on animals,9 without saying what 
                                                 
8 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989) pp.1-2; Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and 
Animal Slavery (Heretic Books, London, 1988). 
9 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.xiii. 
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should be left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan 
appears to be quite straightforward in his demands - for vegetarianism, 
anti-vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping - his idea that it is 
‘commercial’ animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one 
considering what ‘non-commercial’ animal agriculture is envisaged as 
acceptable within his rights theory.10 As he implies, no animal-product 
system is viable in the long term without routine mutilation and 
slaughter, a similar point made in relation to suffering by Singer who 
calls for an end to the use of animals in trivial experiments whilst the 
suffering in non-trivial research can continue until alternative methods 
are found.11 
 
None of the three cases actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case 
for an end to all animal-using practices and, of an activity such as horse 
riding for instance, a classic master/slave relationship, there is no 
mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan concentrated on the 
areas in which vast numbers of animals are used and/or where 
institutionalized cruelties are more readily detectable, and did not set 
out to establish in detail the ‘proper’, or ‘better’ constructed behaviour 
in regard to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they 
establish principles from which we may be able to assume it in most if 
not all areas. But although we may extrapolate in order to get a grip on 
how we should look upon, say, animal circuses - obviously 
unacceptable to Singer, Clark and Regan albeit on different grounds - 
what guidance is there for something as innocuous to the orthodox as 
horse riding?12 
 
It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime 
presented and widely perceived as respectable; the combination of 
animals and war-victory - the hunting field as a preparation for battle 
and the use of animals for human warring purposes; animals considered 
as resources; the exercise of power and the domination of ‘nature’; the 
animal use=civilization equation; and the hidden stories of slavery 
which in different ways lie behind the use of animals - horses ‘broken’, 
family groups separated, animals not up to it or beyond it cast off. 
Moreover, once broken and separated it is still looked upon as a 
kindness to find them ‘work’, to keep them active, a practical example of 
                                                 
10 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, (Routledge, London, 1988), pp.349-351. 
11 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.32. 
12 This is not to enter into the crass area of objection-query - eg what about locusts, 
mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? - in which animal 
liberation is commonly bogged down.  
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culture passing itself off as benign nature (welfarism notably obscuring 
their confinement in barren fields deprived of cover and denied shelter). 
 
Now horse riding is possibly too complex for preference utilitarianism 
to condemn easily and it is not at all clear from Clark's work how it 
stands in relation to the ancient virtues of his neo-Platonist earth 
household. From Regan’s Case we can get the idea that horse riding may 
be anathema to at least rights theory, which can accommodate the 
objection, although it is only an informed guess: Regan's ‘not all harms 
hurt’ and his dissident reality of ‘animals are not our resources’ are 
shown to us in the contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful use.13  
 
As we have seen them so far then, these philosophies do not actually 
spell out what some of them may imply and what they imply could be 
spelled out, and especially in a case such as horse riding. Indeed, 
precisely because of its ‘innocuity’, a condemnation of horse riding - or 
‘riding’ as its practitioners prefer it to be known: again the invisible 
animal - may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a 
position on virtually every topic within the project could be then 
confidently assumed. Perhaps this could help liberate animal liberation 
from the confusion or seemingly endless and generally welfarist- (and 
therefore bloody culture-) framed, cruelty-abuse-suffering-grounded 
debate to which the liberation issue is popularly and politically 
relocated and by the terms of which even vivisection and factory 
farming can be and are easily defended.14   
  
Taking the foremost philosophers’ seminal works, we find discrepancies 
between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have to look 
elsewhere for the kind of consistency15 we may require and get closer to 
a best existing model of and for animal liberation as an abolitionist, 
bloodless culture. 
 
                                                 
13 Bryant condemns horse riding but from an anti-cruelty perspective, albeit within an 
animal ‘rights’ framework. John Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms: An Examination of a 
Changing Ethic (J. M. Bryant, Chard, 1982). 
14 The liberationist fear may be of abolitionism being too easily equated with 
absolutism, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’ (as it is by Jasper and Nelkin) or even 
‘purism’, a fate from which other abolitionisms and emancipations are saved by the 
ability of new rights-holders to negotiate their own ‘working’ roles in society. On that 
score, animal liberation is a threat to the work ethic. J. M. Jasper, and D. Nelkin, The 
Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (The Free Press, New York, 1992), 
p.96, p.178. 
15 This is not to question the internal consistency or  coherence of the adopted or 
adapted philosophies.  
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Veganism: A Neglected Model 
 
Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed in 1944, and the word 
‘vegan’ coined by co-founder and first Secretary Donald Watson, it 
issued a Manifesto which included the following aims: 
 
To advocate that man's food should be derived 
from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other 
wholesome non-animal products and that it should 
exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and animals' 
milk, butter and cheese. 
 
The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised 
how closely the meat and dairy produce industries 
are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in 
some ways, greater than those of the meat industry 
but they are more obscured by ignorance.16 
 
Further, it was proclaimed in 1951, that: 
 
The object of the Vegan Movement (“to end the 
exploitation of animals by man”) is clarified as to 
the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which 
pledges the Society to “seek to end the use of 
animals by man for food, commodities, work, 
hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving 
exploitation of animal life by man”. By the adoption 
of this rule, the Society has clearly come out on the 
side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that 
we seek, as freedom. Our aim is not to make the 
present relationship between man and animal 
(which if honestly viewed is mostly one of master 
and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish it and 
replace it by something more worthy of man’s high 
estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures free - 
to return them to the balance and sanity of nature, 
which is their rightful place, and so end the historic 
wrong perpetrated when man first decided he had 
the right to exploit and enslave them.17 
 
Now this throws up much we could discuss and which many would 
criticize - the perhaps primary concern about who ‘Man’ is; the take on a 
pure ‘nature’; the appeal to design; and so on (these being characteristic 
of the early Vegan Society stance) - but our point is that Leslie Cross 
                                                 
16 ‘The Vegan Society Manifesto’, The Vegan, (November 1944).  
17 Leslie J. Cross, ‘The New Constitution’, The Vegan, (Spring 1951). 
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went on to claim that this new constitution marked the ‘true birth’ of the 
Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the 
slavery analogy, this surely is the best available (albeit unparticularized) 
statement of intent. Can the master/slave relationship of horse riding be 
accommodated here (even if it was beyond the range of contemporary 
concern)? Only by preternormal sophistry.  
 
The Society, and vegans in general, had already established and were to 
consolidate a practical underpinning to animal liberation, living with 
moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm grounding. So, to what 
extent do Singer, Clark and Regan build on such codification? The great 
anomaly is, as we know, that Singer's Animal Liberation actually 
promotes the use of animals. That Singer should, some thirty years after 
the Society’s founding, approach the subject of animal liberation in the 
following way, is perhaps rather curious, notwithstanding the 
reasonable pragmatics - a chapter entitled ‘Becoming a Vegetarian’18 
rather than ‘Becoming a Vegan’; a toleration of mollusc-eating;19 
promotion of egg-eating, where a welfarist-bloody culture stance is 
openly adopted;20 the use of inverted commas for vegan; the phrase ‘… 
some have begun to call themselves vegans’;21 the adoption, like Salt, of a 
‘worst abuses first’ stance;22 the deliberation over where to draw the line 
between killing shrimps and oysters whilst considering the sufferings 
(and suffering is Singer's main concern) of the dairy cow and calf as a 
lesser issue;23 and, in a concession to popular rhetoric, the general 
depiction of veganism as ‘strict’ and somewhat esoteric. Do Clark and 
Regan also keep veganism at arm's length? Clark makes this claim: 
 
What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we 
are to mean what we say in outlawing the 
unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become, 
at the least, vegetarians.24  
 
With veganism well established - and with the routine chickicide of day-
old males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed 
slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed (again) by the Vegan 
Society - Clark did not feel the need to write instead, ‘we must become, 
                                                 
18 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.163. 
19 Ibid., p.179. 
20 Ibid., p.181; Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 1990, Second edition (Pimilco, London, 
1995), pp.175-176. 
21 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.179. 
22 Ibid., pp.181-182. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.45. 
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at the least, vegans’. Although he refers to veganism several times, as a 
stage of progression, thus implying as is usual, that veganism is a 
material development rather than a cognitive transformation (‘… those 
vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism’ he says, for 
instance, in his ‘Notes for Proselytes’ after the main body of the work),25 
it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, he does grant 
veganism greater credibility and probability: ‘There will be less 
suffering in a vegan world, even in a near-vegan world’.26 But, although 
declaring in a footnote that ‘veganism is a better project than lacto-
vegetarianism’, he goes on to say: ‘we may in the end be able to take 
some milk from our kin without injustice’.27 But why this concession to 
the purely cultural (whilst the essentialism of ‘meat’-eating is 
outlawed)? And is this, along with other backyard images, what Regan 
had in mind when he condemned only ‘commercial’ animal agriculture? 
 
There is also Regan's preference for the word ‘vegetarian’ which is used 
throughout The Case for Animal Rights. Now it had for long been the 
American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the 
1940s-50s, to use the word ‘vegetarian’ as all-embracing (and technically 
correct it is or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an 
American Vegan Society since 1960. So it is reasonable to assume that 
Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of commercial animal farming, 
was perhaps thinking veganically, reservations about ‘commercial’ 
notwithstanding. This is supported, for instance, by Regan's later article 
with Gary Francione which claims that rights (now seen in vegan terms) 
and welfare ideologies are morally incompatible, a tacit understanding 
of bloody and bloodless cultures.28 Nevertheless, ‘vegan’ was not used 
ten years earlier in the major work which came partly as a response to 
Singer, who differentiated between vegetarians and vegans.  
 
Is Regan's whole effect warped by not using the word ‘vegan’? Not 
using it can lead not least to problems of both spatial and intellectual 
comprehension as any vegan, considered to be ‘a vegetarian’, has found 
in hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private home. 
The implications are far-reaching, for by it, both here and in Singer and 
Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights theory and indeed 
with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can regularly read 
about celebrities and others being described as ‘vegetarians’ only to find 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p.213. 
26 Ibid., p.80. 
27 Ibid., p.185. 
28 Tom Regan and Gary Francione, ‘A Movement's Means Create its Ends’, The Vegan, 
(Winter, 1993). First published in The Animals' Agenda, (January-February, 1992). 
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that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast, 
constitute a clear and unequivocal statement (or do so when not 
clouded by vegetarianism).  
 
Vegetarianism's milky dilutions would appear not only to weaken the 
vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle but also fail to loosen 
sufficiently orthodoxy’s long established meanings of 
human/nonhuman relations and definitions of animal liberation. There 
can still be detected an accommodating vagueness (and tactical 
tortuousness) which only disappears with veganism’s clearing away of 
shams, fictions and concealments, its lack of concession to orthodox 
ontology and, see Adams 1994, its determining epistemology.29 There is 
a world (or world-view) of difference between vegetarianism and 
veganism. It's a culture thing, as we shall see. 
 
A Repeated Anomaly 
 
The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. For 
whatever reasons or motives (and there is an obvious tension between 
ethics and tactics), veganism was not or appeared not to be the 
philosophers’ alpha (leaving aside pre-verbal mappings) and omega in 
the 1970s and '80s. This had happened before: it is a repeated anomaly. 
In 1892, Henry Salt had claimed in Animals' Rights that assertions of one 
form of animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other, 
were ‘irrelevant’30 whilst at the same time advocating egg-eating, milk-
drinking and wool-wearing.31 What places Salt, like Singer, Clark and 
Regan it would seem, within the increasingly identifiable area of bloody 
and bloodless culture tension are comments which can be juxtaposed 
thus:  
 
It is little use to claim ‘rights’ for animals in a vague 
general way, if with the same breath we explicitly 
show our determination to subordinate those rights 
to anything and everything that can be construed 
into a human ‘want’.32 
 
                                                 
29 Carol J. Adams, ‘Beastly Theology: When Epistemology Creates Ontology’ in her 
Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (Continuum, New York, 
1994). 
30 Henry S. Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, 1892 (Centaur 
Press, Fontwell, 1980), p.106. 
31 e.g. Ibid., p.43; Henry S. Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism: Essays and Dialogues (London 
Vegetarian Society, London, nd (1899)), pp.35-38. 
32 Salt, Animal Rights Considered, p.9. 
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And, perhaps out of a narrow focus on normative cruelty: 
 
What I say will of course have no reference to wool, 
or any other substance which is obtainable without 
injury to the animal from which it is taken.33  
 
For Salt, who considered the question of whether man is morally 
justified in utilizing animal labour at all as ‘abstruse’,34 animals were still 
resources. Further: 
 
I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary 
contention that man is not morally justified in 
imposing any sort of subjection on the lower 
animals.35  
 
He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some 
seventy years earlier, had written: 
 
at least in the present state of society it is unjust, 
and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer 
from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use 
them, and to encourage their being placed in his 
power.36  
 
Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the ‘rights’ 
of women, blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral 
Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes in 1824, a work whose 
strategic and tactical approaches are reversed by Singer: 
 
in our present speciesist world, it is not easy to keep 
so strictly to what is morally right [i.e. not using 
dairy products]. 37 
 
We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some have claimed, 
that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out a lot 
of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being 
more of an uncertain inclination, outlined most of what was to follow, 
and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, animals' personal 
identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause of 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p.79 
34 Ibid., p.43. 
35 Ibid., p.33. 
36 Cited in Ibid. 
37 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.181. 
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what was moral and just, Gompertz was, like some others6,38 a vegan 
long before the word was coined, dispensing with wool, leather, silk 
and eggs and refusing to ride in a horse-drawn carriage. Much of Moral 
Inquiries is taken up in the form of subversionary ‘arguments’ (with 
Gompertz as Z): 
 
Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk; 
what harm can there be in that? 
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for 
man. 
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is 
then a kindness to relieve her of her milk. 
Z: But the calf should not be taken away.39  
 
For both Salt and the philosophers to fall short of overt endorsement of 
Gompertz and veganism also means not capitalizing on the substantive 
shift of his revelatory light which, aptly, he shines on horses. His 
concern with the way they were treated appears foremost in his work 
but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, ‘How can man do 
without the aid of horses?’, Gompertz's reply is, ‘That is his business to 
find out’,40 perhaps a typical response from one famed also for a 
catalogue of technological inventions. He goes on: 
 
It is true that we have adopted the method of 
employing horses to perform our labour, by which 
we have most probably only chosen one method 
out of a great many, and we have remained 
contented with it … What causes you to think the 
services of horses so important to man is, that you 
take things as they are; horses being used….41 
 
What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering 
of horses when most others could not see it (which was Salt's concern), 
but that animals, horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn't 
Salt's concern, until later).42 Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal 
                                                 
38 One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal 
Green in 1680 (see The Vegan, Summer, 1997, p.25) but, as early as 3BC, Porphyry and 
Claudius Neapolitan wrangled over dispensing with all animal products. 
39 Lewis Gompertz, Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and Brutes, 1824 (Centaur 
Press, Fontwell, 1992), p.97. 
40 Ibid., p.122. 
41 Ibid., pp.123-125. 
42 Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's  angle: ‘a civilized posterity will shudder at 
the sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion’. Henry S. Salt, 
Seventy Years Among Savages (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921), p.217. 
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use naturalism and inevitability and, in the milk argument above, of 
bloody culture's tender mercies. 
 
Regardless of the philosophical position or other grounding, and of 
interim tactical considerations, espousing animal liberation without 
affirming and valorizing veganism - as both theoretical starting point 
and practical aim - when the model(s) already exist, takes animal 
liberation’s eyes off the prize. Whether Regan and Clark are promoting 
veganism or not, it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and 
seventy years after Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory 
stance of animal liberationists. Indeed, the recoil, if that's what it is, 
seems endemic. As Leah Leneman has shown us, the vigorous 
correspondence during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society's journal The 
Vegetarian Messenger and Health Review had led to the conclusion that the 
defence of the use of eggs and milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory 
and that the only ‘true way’ was to ‘live on cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and 
vegetables’.43 Nevertheless, in what was becoming a familiar pattern, 
this was reversed in the decades that followed.  
 
The immediate or ultimate disdain, marginalization or even total 
exclusion have also been contagious, and across the spectrum. Robert 
Garner's strategy-minded work, for instance, talks of the vegetarian and 
vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end animal 
cruelty ‘which for them involves the end of the meat industry’ (no 
mention of dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society 
from its listing of the other three organizations which formed the Great 
British MeatOut coalition in the late 1980s.44 The ‘manifesto’ edited by 
Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris had few references to veganism45 
which is at best a subtext in the review-and-recommend essays of the 
Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate.46 Richard D Ryder's 
chronicle47 and (notably from ‘outside’ of animal liberation) Keith 
Tester's new historicist exaggerations48 merely acknowledge veganism, 
                                                 
43 Leah Leneman, ‘Britain's First Vegans?’, The Vegan, (Winter, 1997); Leah Leneman, 
‘No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909-1944’, Society and Animals, 
7/3, (1999), pp.219-228. 
44 Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1993), p.39, p.186. 
45 Ruth Harrison, ‘On Factory Farming’ in R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, and J. Harris 
(eds), Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans  
(Gollancz, London, 1971), p.23. 
46 Robert Garner (ed), Animal Rights: The Changing Debate (Routledge, London, 1996). 
47 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989). 
48 Keith Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (Routledge, London, 
1991). 
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give the briefest of descriptions and fail to record the foundation or 
existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a critique of 
Bryant for whom, almost uniquely, veganism is de rigueur within 
‘animal rights’.49 Ted Benton's eco-socialism, which identifies rights 
theory with an opposition to 'animal agriculture', nevertheless equates it 
with vegetarianism (thus following the Regan confusion) and not 
veganism which, again, is Cinderella'd in favour of a ‘high welfare’ 
model.50 And philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen51 still refer to 
Gompertz as a vegetarian (Singer refers to him as a ‘strict’ vegetarian52) 
and, like Singer, use inverted commas for their reference to vegans. Eder 
too, in referring to animal liberation never mentions veganism and, 
although his ‘vegetarian culture’ is seen in terms of negating social 
order, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism maintains hierarchies in terms of the 
primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative magic of complex 
food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets.53 Indeed, for 
virtually all the popular and academic literature on or referring to 
animal liberation, vegetarianism rather than veganism is the common 
coin.  
 
Moreover, that Donald Watson and Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel54 
and Wynne-Tyson,55 the two works which represent the movement's 
most comprehensive and specific archaeologies of pro-animal thought, 
would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition 
and authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed value-
leaders.56  
 
                                                 
49 Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms 
50 Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (Verso, 
London, 1993). 
51 L. Finsen and S. Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to 
Respect (Twayne, New York, 1994), p.284, p.155. 
52 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.244; Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11. 
53 Eder, The Social Construction of Nature. 
54 Charles R. Magel, Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights (Mansell, London, 
1989). 
55 Jon Wynne-Tyson (ed), The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought, 1985 
(Cardinal, London, 1990). 
56 Nonetheless, the value of Wynne-Tyson's work here resides not least in illustrating 
how animal concern has been edited out by mainstream collections, eg the Oxford 
Dictionary of Quotations. In further defence of Wynne-Tyson we should acknowledge 
his largely overlooked comment on veganism in Food for a Future: ‘The logic of the 
vegan case is absolute. No one - whether nutritionist, physician, sociologist or layman - 
can rebut the veganic argument in any important respect. Veganism is part of the most 
truly civilised concept of life of which the human mind has been capable’. Jon Wynne-
Tyson, Food for a Future: The Complete Case for Vegetarianism, 1975 (Centaur Press, 
Fontwell, 1979), p.107 
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However, there appears to have been a latterday shift towards the 
vegan nexus by some. In several of the campaigning magazines one 
notices at the turn of the millennium - as with Regan and Francione - a 
growing emphasis on veganism in, for instance, the promotion of vegan 
food items and the publication of vegan rather than vegetarian recipes. 
And some hitherto hidden agendas have now been willingly revealed. 
Yet it has all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and 
Cross, indeed with those of Gompertz.  
 
The delay has served to render animal liberation somewhat confusing 
and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement) 
and therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now, the 
Vegetarian Society actively promotes animal products. And, possibly for 
tactical reasons, many of the (now mainly vegan-staffed) organizations 
do still tend to promote by name the more ‘user-friendly’ option of 
vegetarianism, and anti-vivisection organizations have promoted 
‘cruelty-free’ products containing animal ingredients (thus failing to 
redefine cruelty). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, there seems to have 
been an increasing association of vegetarianism with ‘animal rights’ 
through female vegetarian-welfarist celebrities, which may sustain the 
old derogatory representation of sentimental animal concern.  
 
Although there are other factors involved, such as which foods are 
‘male’ and which ‘female’ and which are essentialisms and which 
culturalisms, and all the tactical decisions which will flow from such 
considerations, this has much to do with the ‘worst abuses first’ stance.57 
What is 'worst' is not only arbitrarily decided but appears to depend on 
the extent of one's empirical knowledge of animal use (witness Singer's 
laudable volte-face on wool after reading Townend).58 The movement 
seems to have set in stone the construction that ‘meat’-eating is worse 
than other forms of animal consumption, establishing a hierarchical 
scale to be negotiated as one finds out more, even though knowledge of 
the stories behind all animal products is more readily available now 
than it was in 1892, or even in 1975 (despite the Vegan Society making 
available such information for years prior to then and Singer, like Salt, 
had read Gompertz before laying out his ethics).59 Indeed, submitting to 
                                                 
57 Salt's own ‘worst abuses first’ approach to ‘extreme vegetarianism’ displays a greater 
anticipation of veganism in his later The Logic of Vegetarianism. See George Hendrick 
and Willene Hendrick, The Savour of Salt: A Henry Salt Anthology (Centaur Press, 
Fontwell, 1989), p.27. The particular passage was omitted from the London Vegetarian 
Society's revised and abridged edition (Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism)  
58 Singer, Animal Liberation cf Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed.; Christine Townsend, 
Pulling the Wool (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1985). 
59 Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11. 
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this, the Vegan Society is today reduced to specifically targeting 
vegetarians rather than the general public(s), and the UK has still not 
seen concerted anti-animal milk, anti-egg or anti-wool campaigns. 
(Perhaps there is a linguistic problem: does the inability to name the 
non-milk-egg-wool-using meat-eater preclude the stance and therefore 
bar that road? But, conversely, if to be named is to be controlled, maybe 




Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with 
'animal rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal 
use is welfarist, bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. Carol J 
Adams offers us the notion of ‘the vegetarian quest’, the first step of 
which is  
 
experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat 
as an item of food…which arises because one sees 
that it comes from … someone, and it has been 
made into … no-body. The revelation involves 
recognizing the structure of the absent referent.60  
 
The second step is naming the relationships, eg the connection between 
meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense that animals 
have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the 
recognition of the violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity 
between meat eating and war. This stage also enables the reclaiming of 
appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and mis-
naming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that 
an alternative to meat-eating exists and that it works; ‘vegetarians… 
seek to change the meat eating world’.61 
 
It is the second and third steps in which we are interested here. 
Regarding the possibility of the second - remembering why the Society 
had been formed in 1944 while war was still raging, Donald Watson 
wrote the following (as Leneman62 1999 has reminded us): 
 
Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it 
seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening 
                                                 
60 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory 
(Polity Press, London, 1990), pp.175-179. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Leneman, ‘No Animal Food’. 
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experience of the War, and a reminder that we 
should be doing more about the other holocaust 
that goes on all the time. 63 
 
But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating 
world. Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked 
the non-vegan vegetarian world: it was to be demonstrated that veganism 
works. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between 
warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt,64), it was the effect of the 
second war which, for some, took the process across to re-connect with 
Gompertz's vision. 
 
Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only 
identifies bloody culture rationalism’s nadir but also expands the war 
‘front’ (another of Adams’ notions65) to recognize not just all animals but 
all animal products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw 
earlier, all animal use. But Watson goes on, and in the process both 
disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world creation myth - the 
Egyptian Pyramid Texts’ cultural-need depiction of the pharaoh 
suckling from the cow mother of humankind - and reverses the values 
of sacred and profane: 
 
though nature provides us with lots of examples of 
carnivores and vegetarians it provides us with no 
examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians. 
Such groups are freaks and only made possible by 
man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions 
of other species. This, we thought, could not be 
right either dietetically or ethically. It was certainly 
wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no 
                                                 
63 Donald Watson, ‘Out of the Past’, The Vegan, (Summer, 1988). Watson had also 
grasped what Salt seems to have suspected already at the turn of the century: that the 
virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century evolutionary concepts 
shifted into an unspecific ‘social change’ in the twentieth; that the idea of united, 
comprehensive progress was replaced by an understanding of uneven and partial 
change, different aspects of society falling out of step with each other (notably the 
animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced – one  couldn't 
wait for inevitability or for the ripe time. See Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p.184. In the light of this - and Watson had dealt with the 
‘delaying tactic’: ‘There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to 
posterity, for posterity may not have our ideals’ - we could ask what ‘the plan’ is. To 
wait until an as yet unspecified percentage of the population is vegetarian before 
veganism dare become the name of the game? Donald Watson The Vegan News, 1, 
(November, 1994). 
64 Salt, Seventy Years Among Savages, pp.219-230. 
65 Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat, pp.120-141. 
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spectacle more bizarre than that of a grown man 
attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow.66 
 
Now, if humans have gone from being pre-hunt, pre-ethical vegan to 
being animal eaters and then, only with the neolithic revolution, to full-
blown lacto-ovo-carnivorism then, in this sense, lacto-ovo-
vegetarianism is firmly rooted in animal-based agriculture: it is animal-
using culture’s freakish form of veganism just as the animals used have 
been turned into freakish Forms. 
 
We need to re-assess the two culture concept, as it appears that we now 
have two different versions. One, extending Eder’s thesis, would 
perhaps place veganism as the fuller development of bloodless culture. 
However, if we take our lead from the vegan exemplars, we can suggest 
that veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is 
bloodless culture,67 wherever it originates: most plausibly perhaps in an 
innate alternative potential of both individual and society. We cannot 
suggest that Watson and Cross are claiming any of this, but we can 
suggest that they are, in their turn, discovering and connecting with 
bloodless culture as that very option, one which has been consistently 
rejected and obscured since the time of cultivation and domestication, 
efforts being made ever since to reconnect with the primal sympathy. 
Eder’s bloodless culture starting point in Judaism can be seen as just one 
effort, and the vegan Eden of the troubled writers of Genesis, torn again 
between two cultures, may have been another.  
 
Our entire history can be seen in this light.68 Most of history's ‘bloodless 
culture’ representatives - including the famous anti-cruelty foxhunters 
and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists - have been in some half-way 
house, trying to reach out to a bloodless culture ideal but pulled back by 
the internalized values of bloody culture, the numbing and blinding 
                                                 
66 Watson, ‘Out of the Past’. 
67 Of course, for humans at least, there is probably no such thing as truly bloodless 
culture: it remains an ideal, probably an unattainable one. But, rather than using 
unavoidable bloodletting - eg in the tilling of soil or in defence - as the premiss from 
which to exploit, veganism is surely bloodless culture in its original and continuing 
intent, in its deliberate non-use. It is the bloodless culture of which we know humans to 
be capable. (Gompertz's own suggestion that we might eat animals which died of 
natural causes seems to have been inspired by the belief he was encouraged to hold: 
that his health would suffer without animal products, a familiar story in 1944 and even 
at the turn of the millennium: bloodless culture spells anaemia for the orthodox). 
68 And no less than in the equally valid light of ‘The history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of the struggle between humans and non-humans’. John Simons, 
‘The Longest Revolution: Cultural Studies after Speciesism’, Environmental Values, 6, 
(1997), p.484. 
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comforts of its cosmology(ies), and the entirely practical impossibilities 
which no longer obtain in the Western world.  
 
Vegetarianism itself, seemingly a product of bloody culture, is a cultural 
ersatz, and appropriation. It may be a ‘further step’ from today's 
vegetarianism to  veganism but on a lateral, cross-culture (cognitive) 
route, not on a vertical, intra-culture (material) one. Not so much a 
development or Ederian evolution as an abandonment of one culture for 
another.69 In a remarkable testimony proving that conscience is an 
indispensable factor in the best scientific equation Watson and Cross, 
like Gompertz and others, in much doubt due to orthodoxy's command 
of nutritional knowledge, put bloodless culture in sharper perspective, 
liberated from the eternalization of animal use, from the mythology of 
the animal-product dietary and from the power-based ambivalence of 
human/nonhuman relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism.  
 
And this has many implications, not least of which are for the 
effectiveness of the movement's oppositional discourse and its 
strategic/tactical dilemmas - which ends are dictating which means, or 
vice versa, as the movement shifts, in part, from protest to public policy 
activity70 - and for normative perceptions and ideological 
representations of animal liberation, many of which picture it as an 
extreme of orthodoxy, eg an overidentification with animals, thus of 
course validating the centre of animal-use, using the ALF as a political 
synecdoche (strategy and representation having influenced the 
philosophies in the first place). The equating of animal liberation with 
vegetarianism affords the extreme label a certain legitimacy, for 
vegetarianism seems to reside at bloody culture's refined periphery, at 
its opposite pole to the raw bloody culture of, for example, hunting, 
Roman and Renaissance periods. (Thus circumscribed it remains, albeit 
idiosyncratically, within the realm of private lifestyle-menu options. 
And this relates too to Tester's ability to entrap ‘animal rights’ within 
the realm of bloody culture's anthropocentric ‘entrapment’ of animals). 
But it would be illegitimate to view and represent veganism-animal 
                                                 
69 If there is a sense of development or evolution of bloodless culture it would be, 
perhaps, to fruitarianism but how practicable that would be for whole societies has yet 
to be shown, as have hitherto vague notions of non-exploitative symbiotic human-
nonhuman relations. 
70 The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally 
advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a 
'state of the cause' comment by Singer himself: ‘What disturbs me is the fact that the 
thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals - in other words, for equal 
consideration of the interests of animals - keeps getting sidetracked into small 
increments of progress in animal welfare’. Peter Singer, Interview in Outrage, 
(June/July, 1993). 
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liberation as an extreme rather than as, together, a genuine alternative 
culture, civilization and civilizing process, one which is not defined and 
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71 None of the foregoing has meant to suggest of course that veganism is itself a 
strategy. 
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